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Abstract: This paper offers an analysis of the relation between political populism
and mass media, and how this relation becomes problematic for democratic
societies. It focuses on the fact that mass media, due to their purpose and
infrastructure, can unintentionally reinforce populist messages. Research find-
ings from communication science and political psychology are used to illustrate
how, for example, a combination of mass media agenda setting and motivated
reasoning can influence citizens’ political decisions and impair their political
autonomy. This poses a particular normative challenge for modern democracies:
how to counter these populism-supporting effects within the constraints of
democratic legitimacy? After showing how severely limited legal measures to
curb populist media effects would be, the paper argues in favour of media
competence education as a way of providing future citizens with an epistemic
toolkit to navigate the media environment and strengthen their political
autonomy.
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1 Introduction
Mass media systems, such as newspapers, radio, television, their digital succes-
sors, including an array of internet-based mass communication channels and
social media platforms are an essential part of modern democracies. However, at
the same time the communication mechanisms employed by these media sys-
tems (inadvertently) support modern political populism.1 Politicians and politi-
cal parties have learned to utilise mass media in ways which direct public
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1 With the term political populism I refer to political programmes and political campaigning
which aim to (a) exploit citizens’ concern about topics like, e. g. migration, terrorism, economic
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attention to particular topics and frame perceptions of public events in specif-
ically to suit their agenda.2 Unsurprisingly, this also includes political agents
pursuing a populist agenda. Simultaneously, publishers and broadcasters often
benefit from a populist political climate and a fragmented political landscape
which provides them with key audiences along partisan division lines (e. g. Prior
2010; Mancini 2013). But who bears the moral responsibility for the rise political
populism? It seems that politicians and media publishers alike would make
good candidates.
Yet, this paper will focus on a different aspect of the connection between
political populism and mass media: even without any actor’s deliberate intent,
media systems may still contribute to the success of populist political messag-
ing. This unintentional support of political populism is generated by the struc-
tural and economic conditions under which media systems operate. These
conditions result in certain media effects which are prone to interact with
widespread human cognitive biases. As a result, citizens’ perception of political
facts may be distorted, thereby leading to an impairment of citizens’ political
autonomy. This is why I am going to argue that a liberal democratic state has a
responsibility to counter these effects.
While legal measures appear hardly feasible or justifiable in this context,
the state can nevertheless provide knowledge and skills for its citizens through
media competence education. This would be a justifiable and cost-effective way
to support citizens’ ability to identify certain types of media effects and raise
awareness of how they can influence their political decision making. My aim is
to demonstrate that media competence education can and should be an impor-
tant part of a solution for the contemporary problem of political populism, and
that this type of education is justifiable on widely accepted liberal democratic
terms. Moreover, states might even be morally required to provide media com-
petence education.
Before going into more detail, let me summarise the main problem briefly.
As the time and attention of audiences as well as the operational resources
of two media providers are limited, decisions on what to report about (on the
publisher/provider side) and what contents to access (on the audience side)
must necessarily be made. In addition, media providers who want to stay in
injustice etc., and to (b) achieve political goals that are to a high degree incompatible with
liberal democratic principles.
2 Analyses of the relation between politics and mass media in this sense can be found in, e. g.
Mazzoleni (1987), Cook (1999), Bennett (2004), Boin et al. (2009), Hopmann et al. (2011), Mercille
(2015).
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business are subject to market constraints requiring economic efficiency.3 As a
consequence of these limitations of mass media communication, the unintended
populist side-effects of media systems, or populist media effects as I will call
them throughout this paper, cannot be avoided. Therefore, it would be unjusti-
fied to assign moral blame to politician or media publishers for these unin-
tended effects.4
One could, of course, try to change the mass media systems themselves so
much that populist media effects will no longer occur, e. g. by extensive regu-
lation or state-controlled programming. However, this seems like an impossible
task so long as one thinks of media systems as institutions that operate in
principle independent from the political sphere and which may even take on
the role of a fourth estate, through critical scrutiny of the realm of politics.5 Any
restructuring or censoring of mass media with the aim to counter populist media
effects would constitute a massive interference with citizens’ freedom of speech
and most likely harm free democratic communication. Moreover, most media
effects depend on the technical nature of mass communication and on the
psychological condition of human audiences. No political restructuring short
of abandoning mass communication completely would therefore be able to
eliminate populist media effects.
While changing media systems is no viable option, another way of keeping
populist media effects at bay is to address the responsibilities of the audience
itself, i. e. the common citizen. Citizens’ reception of media content contributes
to the success of populist media effects and to some degree citizens can critically
assess the media content presented to them. To do so, citizens need appropriate
epistemic tools to make autonomous, responsible political decisions. Only if
they have a sufficient degree of media competence, citizens can make mean-
ingful decisions about how to interpret a given piece of media information.
3 An alternative which avoids economic constraints on mass media, it seems, would be a state-
run media system. While there are good reasons to be critical of market-based media systems, it
occurs to me that state-run media systems are at a high risk of being ‘hijacked’ by government
interests. An intermediate solution might be hybrid media systems where publicly financed
media providers compete with purely market-based providers, as it is the case in, e. g. Germany
or the UK. However, the problems of purely market-based media systems apply for hybrid
systems as well, although perhaps the state-run segment is to some degree immune to market
pressures. At the same time, though, state-run media providers are still vulnerable to accusa-
tions of being just a government mouthpiece.
4 Note that blaming these parties remains legitimate in cases of intentional populist exploita-
tion of media systems.
5 If one prefers to think of the media system more as a fourth branch of government and in no
way independent of politics, my argument in favour of media competence education should be
even more convincing.
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This required knowledge and awareness of the influence of media effects on
one’s decisions must be acquired and developed. Indeed, a wide variety of
media and information competence and literacy education is already happening
in democratic societies and has been adopted as an official educational strategy
by international institutions like the UNESCO (2013).
Media competence, as I understand it in the context of this paper, is a
combination of two kinds of knowledge and the skills to apply the relevant
knowledge correctly. The first is theoretical knowledge about the technical and
structural possibilities and restrictions of modern mass media (including inter-
net-based media forms), about how media output is shaped by these factors, and
how the output itself affects an audience’s perception. The second kind is a more
practical sort of knowledge, as it enables citizens to apply the first kind of
knowledge in real life, i. e. to actually spot instances of populist media effects
which may have an influence on their political opinion. This specific kind of
media competence education, which can be part of a package of more general
media literacy education, aims at fostering a very specific aspect of critical
thinking limited to the particular domain of information conveyed by mass
media.6 It is one of several building blocks for the sort of ‘”cognitive defence”
against […] sensationalism and propaganda’ (Hobbs and Jensen 2009, p. 3) that
has been a general aim of media literacy education for at least the last sixty
years.
In this paper I argue that citizens need sufficient media competence educa-
tion to counter populist media effects and make politically autonomous deci-
sions, particularly in light of populist tendencies becoming more mainstream in
many contemporary democratic states. Media competence education could, to
use a metaphor, inoculate citizens against political populism by developing their
awareness of the effects that the media have on their political decision making.
What is required from the perspective of political philosophy, however, is a
justificatory argument in favour of this kind of education. Such an argument
should draw on established principles of liberal and democratic political theo-
ries in order to provide solid ground for appropriate policy decisions. The ability
of citizens to make autonomous decisions plays a major justificatory role here,
as it is a basic requirement implied in almost all political theories concerned
with citizenship. This includes theories with substantively moralised premises as
well as those with normatively thin notions of citizenship and political respon-
sibility. In the following, I will offer various moral as well as prudential reasons
for a democratic state to provide media competence education for its citizens.
6 I will say more about the content of the sort of media competence education I have in mind in
Section 6.
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I start in Section 2 with explaining psychological mechanisms of human
reasoning and the media effects which interact with them and eventually can
lead to an unintended support of political populism. In Section 3 I argue that the
resulting populist media effects constitute a relevant restriction of citizens’
political autonomy under various theoretical frameworks by which one can
model democratic citizenship. Section 4 establishes that nobody bears direct
responsibility for populist media effects but that a democratic state has a
responsibility to provide citizens with adequate means to engage with these
effects. The limited feasibility and justifiability of legal options to counter
populist media effects is evaluated in Section 5, while I argue in Section 6 in
favour of (increased) media competence education to enable citizens to make
more informed political decisions. Section 7 summarises my analysis and the
arguments given in this paper.
2 Populist media effects
While the deliberate populist manipulation of news and media coverage is not
uncommon, my focus in this paper is on the coincidental side effects that might
benefit populist campaigning. Media support for populist aims can be generated
without any agent deliberately and actively trying to achieve them. The mech-
anism providing this unintentional support is a combination of two factors. The
first factor are cognitive biases which affect human decision processes and can
lead to seemingly unreasonable choices. The second factor are media effects that
occur due to the structural limitations of mass media, as a result of which
mediated information must always be pre-selected and framed in certain ways.
The interaction of these two factors eventually leads to sub-optimal political
opinion formation on the side of the audience which might in turn lend support
to populist tendencies among citizens. This is why I label them populist media
effects.7 For a better understanding of how populist media effects are generated
and how they influence citizens’ political attitudes, it will be helpful to give a
more detailed summary of the relevant factors.
7 Strictly speaking, the effects I describe here are not restricted to the support of political
populist attitudes. Depending on the topics on the media agenda and the political climate, these
effects could also generate support for, e. g. stable centre-left politics. However, under the
circumstances currently found in Western democracies, it seems that political populism is the
main beneficiary. I use the label populist media effects therefore to pick out media effects in a
particular socio-political context where these media effects mainly generate or maintain polit-
ical views among citizens which make them more likely to support political populist agendas.
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2.1 People as information processors
The unfortunate consequences of populist media effects arise in part due to the
basic configuration of the human brain itself. Human decision making processes
are generally subject to various heuristic errors and cognitive biases (see, e. g.
Kahneman and Tversky 1982, 2000; Yamagishi et al. 2007), and decision making
in political matters is no exception. Prominent cognitive biases that influence
decision making are, e. g. confirmation bias, intergroup bias, availability bias,
and motivated reasoning, to name just a few. In the following I will focus on
motivated reasoning and the research that captures its influence on political
decision making of voters (see, e. g. Kunda 1987, 1990; Redlawsk 2002; Kahan
2013). This should provide an impression of the general problems political mass
communication faces.
According to motivated reasoning research, people usually aim to fit new
information they encounter into their already existing belief systems. To realise
this aim, motivated reasoners apply certain cognitive strategies, which I will
describe in more detail below. The reason for this behaviour is the fact that
beliefs about political state of affairs are usually not just stored as purely neutral
information by the human cognitive system but instead also have affective
components that influence the way contradictory political information is pro-
cessed (see Redlawsk 2002; Redlawsk et al. 2010). This strategy can be observed
across a range of cognitive contexts, including political opinion formation.
Political opinions or views are, simply speaking, not mere beliefs, but form
part of a more complex mental state that also includes affective components
like emotions. These affective components motivate people to hold on to certain
beliefs they feel attached to, even in the light of new contradictory information.8
Individuals encountering new political information which collides with their
existing political views will therefore often employ various strategies to secure
the structure of their belief system (see Nyhan and Reifler 2010). One strategy is
to rely on biased search processes, i. e. mainly gathering information from
sources which are known to provide information fitting well with already held
8 A clarificatory note on terminology might be useful at this point: the term ‘information’
(either with the qualifier ‘political’ or otherwise) designates purely factual information.
However, this does not imply that, e. g. media reports conveying factual political information
are free of any evaluative or normative aspects – usually they are not.
‘Political opinions’ or ‘views’ in contrast, terms which I use interchangeably, are meant to
designate complex mental states that involve beliefs about facts (political information) as well
as evaluative/normative components.
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political beliefs.9 Another mechanism is the generation of counter-arguments
against new, contradictory information. During this process, individuals re-
evaluate the possible reasons for holding on to their existing beliefs and try to
develop arguments against the new information. Their counter-arguments do
not have to be very good or even arguments in a strict sense, though. While
remembering the reasons they had to endorse the beliefs in question, individu-
als involved in motivated reasoning also re-activate the affective components
linked to these beliefs, so that at the end of the process they might even feel
more certain about their existing beliefs – even if these might be proven wrong
by the new information from an external perspective. Confrontation with contra-
dictory information seems to lead to a ‘backfire effect’ in these cases, increasing
the strength of individuals’ political opinions (see, e. g. Gollust et al. 2009;
Nyhan and Reifler 2010, Flynn et al. 2017; for a more critical perspective on
the backfire effect see Wood and Porter 2019).
This is not to say that individuals never change their political opinions. It
rather shows that it takes more than just a few facts which contradict their
current position to make people abandon dearly held political views. The contra-
dicting information needs to be significant and convincing enough to reach an
‘affective tipping point’, at which existing motivated reasoning mechanisms are
bypassed (see Redlawsk et al. 2010). In highly fragmented modern media envi-
ronments, which are often designed to serve the political views of a particular
target audience, there is an increased risk that the required pressure to overcome
motivated reasoning never sufficiently builds up. In addition, the structural
necessities of mass media providers and the limited time audiences spend on
news and political information make it even less likely that individuals reach the
tipping point at which they revise their political opinion.
In the next sub-section, I will give a brief summary of a media effect that
supports the tendency to employ motivated reasoning in political contexts: the
capacity of mass media to set the public agenda and thereby determine (to at
least a relevant degree) the political opinions of citizens.
2.2 Media as agenda setters
Mass media shape the content they deliver and thereby the political information
audiences acquire. Of the various existing research approaches regarding media
9 The individualised filter bubbles of internet search engines as well as the personalised
information environment of social media platforms appear to substantially support these biased
search processes in the digital sphere.
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effects, I will discuss agenda setting theory briefly here, due to its relevance for
the unintentional reinforcement of populist messages. My general argument
does not rely on this particular theory, though, and if needed, the populist
potential of mass media would be transferable to other media effect theories
as well. My aim is merely to demonstrate that there is a pressing case to think
about the (non-intentional) interaction between mass media and populism
which can be modelled by contemporary media theory and social psychology.
By selecting the topics and the way in which to report about them, the
media affect the public agenda, which is the set of topics that members of a
society think of as the most important public topics at a given time. Because
it is impossible to keep track of national and international politics without
access to media information in modern mass democracies, the public
agenda, and thereby to a large degree also public opinion, is developed in
response to an artificial information environment construed by mass
media.10 As a result the public agenda of citizens reflects quite accurately
the media agenda, i. e. the set of topics dominating the media at a given
time (see McCombs 2004).
This narrowing down of topics is already a potential problem for demo-
cratic societies. If citizens are supposed to be sufficiently well-informed about
their political environment, topics that might be of importance might just go
unnoticed. Conversely, if a topic appears repeatedly on the media agenda and
thereby on the public agenda, citizens will assign a much higher priority to it.
For example, if migration as a topic that is central to populist political cam-
paigning repeatedly turns up on the public agenda, this basic kind of agenda
setting can already contribute to political populism, making audiences more
likely to consider it important when compared to other political issues which
do not make it onto the public agenda. If topics on the media and public
agenda are topics predominantly addressed by populist actors, large parts of
the audience might get the impression that populist actors are indeed the only
political actors concerned with the most pressing political issues – even if
these issues only attain their perceived importance due to their media
presence.
Another form of agenda setting which is even more relevant under condi-
tions of present political campaigning is so-called second-level agenda setting,
also referred to as attribute agenda setting. Attribute agenda setting affects not
10 Supposedly one could assume that there was no public agenda before any systems of mass
communication evolved, although this would be a discussion beyond the scope of this paper. In
contemporary democratic societies, at least, the public agenda is observably connected to the
means of mass communication.
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only what audiences think are significant topics at a given time but also how to
think about them (see Balmas and Sheafer 2010). In the case of attribute agenda
setting, media reports about an agenda setting object emphasise certain attrib-
utes, i. e. descriptive properties of that object. The most noteworthy aspect of
attribute agenda setting is that it determines how the public perceives these
objects in evaluative terms, including moral ones. A typical example of attribute
agenda setting, the significance of which increases with the trend towards
personalised political campaigning, is agenda setting with respect to candidates’
character traits. Repetitive emphasis, e. g. on a candidate’s straightforwardness
(‘he tells it like it is’) will convince voters to elect this candidate due to the
perceived favourable character traits.
Taking migration as an example once more, certain kinds of attributes of the
agenda setting object ‘migration’ might be emphasised, such as the fact that
there will be criminal immigrants. While it is close to certain that the percentage
of criminal individuals among immigrants is not higher than in the native
population, the newsworthiness of crimes committed by immigrants, and the
emphasis on the fact that the perpetrators in a particular case have an immi-
grant background will, e. g. provide the audience with a particular mental lens
through which to perceive immigrants: as potential criminals and a serious risk
to society.
Agenda setting effects are, at least in liberal democratic societies with a
decentralised media system, largely unintended effects. They occur due to
factors inherent in the structure of media systems themselves. Time and resour-
ces of media providers are limited, so decisions must be made which topics will
make it into a news feature, an article, or a blog post. These decisions depend on
a variety of factors, not the least of which is their (assumed) newsworthiness. A
topic that will interest the audience and thereby increase the probability for
them to return to the same media outlet later is more likely to become a news
item than a topic lacking this potential. In addition, what is considered as a
relevant topic is subject to intermedia agenda setting – if several other media
providers with significant impact have a topic on their agenda, it is more likely
that other providers will jump on the bandwagon and start treating the same
topic as a high priority news item.
Both aspects combined, the cognitive biases of audiences and media effects
like agenda setting, result in populist media effects – effects that influence the
political judgement of citizens in ways making them more receptive to populist
political messages and build up an acceptance for populist, often undemocratic
and illiberal views. In the next section, I will argue that this development has a
detrimental effect on citizens’ political autonomy.
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3 Impairment of political autonomy
After this brief overview of how populist media effects develop, it is time to
address how imperfect human reasoning and agenda setting effects affect the
political autonomy of citizens. As a first step, I will offer a brief definition of my
use of the term political autonomy.
It would not be very helpful to draw up a detailed, substantive account of
political autonomy here. That would be a task beyond the scope of this paper,
and it is also not necessary for arguing in favour of media competence educa-
tion. Instead my much simpler claim is that for most accounts of political
autonomy connected to theories of democratic citizenship, interference with
citizens’ political reasoning as described in the previous section would mean a
restriction of citizens’ political autonomy. Let me outline some characteristics
that theories of democratic citizenship have in common and that can be used to
define a ready-to-go account of political autonomy.
Depending on the underlying theory of democratic citizenship, a conception
of political autonomy11 will refer to slightly different capacities of citizens,
therefore it is helpful to make a rough distinction between two types of norma-
tive theories here. The first type of citizenship account can be labelled ‘other-
regarding’, the second type ‘self-regarding’.
Other-regarding theories of democratic citizenship assume a normative frame-
work within which citizens have certain obligation towards their fellow citizens in
the process of political deliberation. These frameworks are needed to justify the
political coercion that is a result of most if not all political decisions. Parliamentary
decisions about laws, or referenda in cases of direct democratic decisions, always
lead to a political state of affairs that some citizens would not have chosen but are
coerced to obey. For this coercion to be justified, citizens (including politicians)
involved in the decision process are usually subject to normative restraints to secure
respect for the positions of their fellow citizens. These are theories of deliberative
democracy and public reason liberalism.12 According to these theories, the reasons
motivating citizens’ political decisions should be acceptable reasons not only for
11 I use the distinction between concept and conception in this paper as used in John Rawls’s
work about reasonable pluralism (2005). While most political philosophers agree that citizens
have some form of political autonomy (agreeing on the concept), they have varying ideas how
exactly political autonomy should be defined (disagreeing on the correct conception).
12 Accounts of other-regarding citizenship vary widely, of course, in their details about how to
justify political coercion and on which normative standards justification must be based.
Theories of this kind can be found in, e. g. Habermas (1984, 1996), Rawls (2005), Christiano
(1996, 2008), Gaus (1996), Gutmann (1996), Waldron (1999).
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themselves but also from the perspective of their fellow citizens, regardless of social
background or other properties that would be considered arbitrary from an impar-
tial moral perspective. These restrictions are often expressed as moral duties or
responsibilities that citizens have toward their fellow citizens.
Other-regarding theories often operate with models of idealised societies for
which they develop standards of justification. Yet, so long as these theories claim
to generate guidelines for real-life political and social application, they need to
consider the epistemic environment of citizens in modern democracies and rec-
ognise the fact that most of the political information is acquired by citizens via
mass media. Citizens’ justification of their political decisions is to a large extent
based on this information. Requiring justifiable political decisions presupposes
that citizens have reliable information about the world views and standards of
other social groups in their society, and at least about the major implications their
choices might have. Without a sufficient knowledge about the current state of
their society, any attempt to make justified decisions seems impossible.
Therefore, regardless of the exact standards and modes of justification, a
minimum of correct information about the facts feeding into political decisions
are necessary. Any theoretical framework that requires citizens to adhere to its
standards must also require conditions under which citizens have undistorted
access to information which is relevant for their democratic decisions. The
ability to understand media effects that support populist arguments is, I believe,
one of these conditions. If this is the case, then normative requirements on
political decision making also imply a requirement for a sufficient degree of
media competence on the side of citizens.
Without a sufficient understanding of the particularities and limits of mass
media, populist media effects are prone to distort citizens’ political decision
process, thereby impairing their capacity to make justified political decisions. If
this capacity is considered a central aspect of political autonomy, then populist
media effects are detrimental to citizens’ political autonomy from the perspec-
tive of other-regarding theories.
In contrast to the other-regarding democratic theories stand what I want to
call self-regarding theories of democratic citizenship. These theories, often
derived from economic theories about social behaviour, argue that citizens
(especially in their role as voters) make self-interested decisions and that they
are legitimately expected to do so. Any further requirements of political morality
would be idealistic and hardly feasible.13 Obviously, from this perspective
13 I take public choice theories at large to be self-regarding theories of citizenship, as, e. g.
found in Buchanan (1984), Brennan and Lomasky (1993), Buchanan and Tullock (1999), Mueller
(2003).
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citizens do no need specific information about the interests or world views of
their fellow citizens, which would be necessary to make other-regarding political
decisions. Nevertheless, self-regarding citizens need valid information as well.
To make sound judgements about what sort of candidates, parties, and political
measures will serve their individual interests best, citizens needs some knowl-
edge about political programmes and the implications of policies.
Self-regarding accounts of citizenship provide less of a normative back-
ground on which to base a conception of political autonomy; probably quite a
few public choice theorists would deny that anything meaningful can be said
about the political autonomy of citizens, the concept of autonomy itself being
already too normatively loaded to make any sense in the context of their theory.
However, I deem it safe to assume that the self-regarding perspective on democ-
racy must imply an interest of voters to either make political decisions that are in
their own best interest, or that they at least think are in their interest.14 For the
purpose of this paper, I will treat the capacity to make sufficiently informed
decision in regard to one’s self-interest (actual or expressive) as a form of
political autonomy, although very different from the conception that is implied
by other-regarding accounts of citizenship. Nevertheless, distortion of citizens’
political decision making due to populist media effects results in a decreased
capacity to make correct decisions in this regard, which would also be an
impairment of the self-regarding version of political autonomy.
Finally, I need to concede that there are of course theoretical positions that
are beyond the reach of my argument. Jason Brennan, for example, argues
against the idea that democratic participation is in any way autonomy-support-
ing, as a single citizens’ vote in an election makes virtually no difference in the
outcome. When applying a conception of ‘autonomy as difference making’,
where the degree of autonomy directly related to the degree of changes in the
world an agent’s action brings about, the degree of autonomy in political
participation for the common citizens must also be virtually none (see
Brennan 2016, pp. 88ff.). While I agree that this would be the case if autonomy
as difference making were the correct conception to apply in the political
context, I do not think that it actually is. I cannot give a detailed argument
against this view here but nevertheless want to suggest that in a political context
14 As Brennan and Lomasky argue, the decisions of voters are not so much plain attempts to
further self-interest but have an expressive function, which leaves room for a variety of
normative attitudes to be expressed in political decision making. In this case, not all political
decisions voters make might be in their actual interest; expressive voting could lead to out-
comes that might be in no one’s actual interest, such as, e. g. referenda or elections leading to
war (Brennan and Lomasky 1993, pp. 49ff.).
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decisions and actions of groups bring about political change, and that an
individual’s contribution to group agency might be relevant for its degree of
political autonomy. However, those who share Brennan’s position that demo-
cratic participation has no value in terms of individual autonomy might not find
anything compelling in media competence education for citizens.
Apart from this last perspective, though, it seems to me that the problem
of the impairment of citizens’ political autonomy poses a problem for a
broad range of liberal democratic frameworks. Cognitive biases combined
with agenda setting effects are distorting the information transfer between
citizens and their political environment, and thereby the formation of rea-
sonable political beliefs and attitudes. Any theoretical framework that cares
about the political autonomy of citizens (regardless whether it uses this term
or not) is faced with the question of how to cope with this problem. There
may be a range of factors that are able to counteract the systemic distortion
of political decision-making processes that results from mass media commu-
nication. For now, I however want to focus on the state as the agent bearing
a responsibility to counter populist media effects. In the following section I
will give a more detailed answer to the question why the state has this
responsibility.
4 Political responsibility
At this point I want to remind the reader that for the aspects of mass commu-
nication I described in Section 2 and which I labelled populist media effects,
there are no responsible agents in any moral sense. This is not to say that agents
who are deliberately exploiting the cognitive biases and media effects involved
are not morally responsible – they certainly are. Most contemporary politicians
who engage in populist political campaigning are aware of the opportunities of
exploiting mass media. My current focus lies not on these clearly identifiable
(and responsible) agents but on practices often aiming at neutrality and objec-
tivity, like news reporting, which may also contribute to populist political effects
without any of the involved agents intending to do so.
However, the lack of responsibility for producing populist media effects
does not mean a complete lack of responsibility when it comes to countering
these effects. This responsibility can be rendered in different ways, similar to the
distinctions I made in Section 3 between other-regarding and self-regarding
accounts of citizenship.
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If one accepts that state authority is morally justified, it appears that the
state as a political agent has some sort of obligation to at least attempt to
decrease the disadvantageous side of mass media effects on democratic decision
processes. If the state’s authority is morally legitimate, then this legitimacy is at
least to some degree bound to the extent to which the state enables citizens to
exercise their capacity for political autonomy and to participate in democratic
deliberation. By refusing to attempt to secure its citizens political autonomy, the
state would undermine its own legitimacy. A legitimate state has therefore
necessarily an obligation to protect its citizens from an impairment of their
political autonomy.
Even if one tends toward philosophical anarchism and denies any moral
legitimacy, and therefore the application of moral concepts like ‘duty’ or ‘respon-
sibility’ for the relation between the state and its citizens, there are relevant
prudential reasons for states to care about citizens’ political autonomy. Populist
political movements tend to endanger stability of democratic states and might
lead to a deterioration or perhaps even collapse of existing democratic institu-
tions. In turn, the degree of individual freedom decreases, leaving people with
fewer, and perhaps less attractive opportunities to shape their lives than they
would have in a fully functional liberal democratic state. So even if the govern-
ment as an artificial agent stands not in any moral relation to its citizens, it is
reasonable to assume that everyone involved, politicians as well as average
citizens, should have a rational interest in the stability of democratic institutions.
If one further assumes that one of the central functions of the state is to act in the
interest of its citizens, states still ought to offer measures to counter populist
effects for prudential reasons. This can be called prudential responsibility.
From either perspective it therefore seems that the state has some sort of
responsibility, either on moral or on prudential grounds, to keep political
populism at bay.15 As I mentioned before, populism has many different causes
and spreads via a multiplicity of vectors, so of course any effective strategy
against populism needs to be similarly multifaceted. Preventing the spread of
political populism via mass media should be one part of such a strategy, and in
the following sections I will discuss two different ways the state could attempt to
do so.
15 These two options are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that the state’s responsibility is
overdetermined; in addition to moral reasons (if one believes that morality is relevant in this
context) there can be significant prudential reasons as well to safeguard democracy against
populist tendencies.
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5 Regulation
The first thing to think of when contemplating government measures to decrease
populist media effects might be regulation by law. Laws are, after all, one of the
main instruments of states to impose the kind of order that the government (and
perhaps a majority of citizens) assume to be beneficial. Legislation is a powerful
instrument to create incentives to act in certain ways. The tools available to
states are not the only prohibition of harmful goods or services. Taxation or
licensing offer similarly effective means to regulate behaviour.
However, a liberal and democratic state needs to justify cases of restrictive
legislation, as they usually limit citizens’ freedom. The requirement for justifi-
cation is particularly strong in the case of laws restricting media because this is
potentially limiting the freedom of expression of citizens and any restriction of
this basic liberal democratic principle must ask for very robust justificatory
reasons. Two major principles that are often referred to when justifying restric-
tions on the freedom of expression are John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle and Joel
Feinberg’s Offence Principle (see Cohen-Almagor 2005). While both have their
place in the debate about free speech and its limits, I do not think that either of
them is useful when it comes to populist media effects. Let me explain why.
The Harm Principle can justify restrictions of free expression in cases where
speech will quite certainly lead to harmful consequences, as illustrated in Mill’s
famous example of an inciting speech given to a mob in front of a corn-dealer’s
house (see Mill 2008, p. 62). While Mill’s own example leaves a lot of questions
unanswered, the common modern interpretation is that ‘the intention to lead
people to harmful action constitutes an instigation’ (Cohen-Almagor 2005,
pp. 5f.), in which case legal restrictions are justified.
Although the Harm Principle justifies restriction of free expression in cases
where harm is intended and likely to occur, it is toothless in the case of populist
media effects due to the context from which these effects arise. As I explained in
Section 2, populist media effects occur due to technological and economic side
constraints of mass media systems, without any agents aiming at creating them,
thereby eluding the Harm Principle’s justificatory mechanism. It might be that
all individual agents involved in the news cycle have strict professional ethics
that focus on objective and neutral reporting but nevertheless, populist media
effects keep occurring.
Due to the limits of the Harm Principle, Feinberg argues that reasons beyond
harm might be relevant for limiting certain expressive activities. He develops the
Offence Principle (see Feinberg 1985), which states that one is genuinely offended
(and thus, perhaps, entitled to state regulation concerning the offence) if (a) one
Inoculation against Populism 15
Authenticated | frodo.podschwadek@gmail.com author's copy
Download Date | 9/26/19 9:01 AM
suffers a disliked state, (b) one attributes that state to the wrongful conduct of
another, and (c) one resents the other for his or her role in causing one to be in
that disliked state. This set of conditions certainly covers a range of cases for
media legislation (e. g. laws regulating violent or pornographic media content),
although determining when (perceived) offence is a robust reason for limiting
others’ freedom of expression can be a tricky task, often mired in disagreement
and dependent on the cultural context (see Feinberg 1985, pp. 47f.).
Even though the Offence Principle offers a wider range of application than the
Harm Principle, it is hard to see how it could be used to justify media restriction
on grounds of populist media effects. First, it is unlikely that someone would
suffer a disliked state directly due to populist media effects, although one could
construct an exotic case of highly reflective media theorists and political philos-
ophers feeling seriously offended by the daily evening news. While this would
satisfy the first condition for offence, it must fail at the second condition – there
simply is no one this state could be attributed to, no individual which caused this
state.16
It looks like justification for potential government regulation of populist
media effects cannot be gained by employing these two established principles
from the debate about free speech and expression. Justification for restriction
would need to rest on other grounds. As I have argued, populist media effects
result in an impairment of the political autonomy of citizens. While the talk
about political autonomy has a slightly theoretical ring, it would be possible to
translate it into phrases more suitable for every-day politics, such as citizens’
right to balanced information and sound political choice. A more consequenti-
alist justificatory route could emphasise the risk populist media effects pose to
social stability, the increasing social fragmentation and dissent, and similar
consequences.
Yet, even if some degree of justification for regulations limiting mass media
can be given on these grounds, the prospect of success of regulatory measures
remains uncertain. At the same time, such measures would come at a high
justificatory cost from a democratic perspective, as the following two problems
illustrate.
The first problem is related to the independence of the media. It is unlikely
that restrictions of populist media effects by law can be realised without
16 One could insist that media providers are a sort of collective agent and can as such indeed
bear a responsibility to the offence somebody takes in populist media effects. In this case, the
offence taken would be caused by the very nature of media systems and therefore would require
abolishing existing media systems as a whole. This does not seem like a plausible application of
the Offence Principle.
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sweeping illiberal and undemocratic side-effects. Getting the upper hand on
systemic media effects would require some heavy-handed state interference
with existing media systems, as the government would effectively have to
change the way media providers work. Media providers would need to be
removed from a free market context and work in an isolated sphere, where
resources are not allocated by market mechanisms but by state funding alone.
Even then, the audience’s time to follow media reports is limited, and psycho-
logical mechanisms like motivated reasoning will persist. Not only would such
an attempt be prone to fail, it would also resemble the government strategies of
historical communist states more than anything else. It appears that such a
profound regulation of media systems would do more harm than good and
would certainly not be supportive of democratic information exchange.
The second problem with regulation would be that a thorough interference
with mass media to curb populist media effects would itself imply a pre-selec-
tion of the ways how content is presented, which, again, could be taken as an
impairment of citizens’ political autonomy. While the details of how such a
regulatory practice could be implemented are elusive (to say the least), it seems
that any such practice would bear a striking resemblance to straightforward
censorship. In order to prevent one way of impairment of citizens’ political
autonomy, the state would need to impair it in a different way. This sort of
trade-off would gain not much in terms of improving and sustaining political
autonomy, while causing significant costs for implementation and maintenance.
To summarise, any attempt to regulate mass media to counter populist
media effects is difficult to justify and would be even more difficult to realise.
Therefore, I suggest in the next section that it might be more promising to aim at
education instead of regulation.
6 Education
A different strategy available to the state to counter populist media effects is
education. This approach has several advantages over regulation: it relies on an
educational infrastructure that is prima facie justified and already in place in
modern democracies, and it does not interfere in any way with the freedom of
expression of media providers. I also assume it to be genuinely autonomy-
supporting.
In order to successfully teach students about populist media effects, media
competence education first needs to convey the knowledge of how these effects
work and why they are in place. While this needs to include theory-focused
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lessons about the technical and economic structures of mass media, media
competence education should also aim to work with examples from contempo-
rary media reporting to demonstrate the relevant effects and let students them-
selves apply their previously acquired knowledge. Further practical exercises
could include, e. g. letting students themselves produce short news features
about current social or political topics to gain a better understanding of the
structural conditions shaping mass media output. A variety of strategies suitable
for this kind of teaching can be found in the literature on practical media
competence and literacy education.17
An important advantage is that educational infrastructure already exists.
Where democratic states do not provide education themselves, they set the
requirements for education, and by determining the structure of school curric-
ula, they can provide children with the necessary epistemic toolkit they will
need once they become full-grown citizens. Media competence education can be
incorporated into current school curricula with comparably small efforts.
More important still, from a normative perspective, is the range of well-
established justificatory arguments for an education of children aiming to pro-
vide them with the knowledge and attitudes they will need as autonomous
citizens. Even though political philosophers might disagree about the details,
there is a widespread consensus that liberal democratic states should supply
adequate education for children. Proper education is assumed to be a require-
ment of justice, supplying children with the necessary skills and knowledge to
become autonomous citizens with a capacity to lead a flourishing life (see Rawls
2005; Brennan 2002; Brighouse 2009). Further, education qualifies as a require-
ment of democratic stability for many political philosophers, which is important
to maintain a liberal democratic state over generations (see Gutmann 1999;
Callan 2010). Many accounts of liberal democratic education combine elements
from both views, arguing that it contributes to the capacity of citizens to live an
autonomous and good life as well as to political and social stability (see Galston
1991; Reidy 2001; Levinson 2004). Independent of the details of these different
accounts, it seems safe to assume that their proponents would agree with the
claim that media competence education contributes to the general goals of
liberal democratic education.18
17 For examples see, e. g. Considine et al. (2009), Hague and Payton (2010). While the current
literature on media literacy tends to focus on digital media literacy, many of the teaching
approaches are useful to teach the type of media competence advocated in this paper.
18 How effective media competence education is under real-world circumstances remains,
nevertheless, an empirical question. For social or psychological reasons not considered in
this paper, it might fail to achieve any improvements of citizens’ political well-informedness
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At the same time, education for media competence is no threat to freedom of
speech and expression. In contrast to regulatory approaches to counter populist
media effects, education for media competence does not interfere with mass
media systems at all. Neither the working processes nor the content of media
systems is subject to state control, therefore we do not need to consider any
special justification for potentially limiting essential liberal democratic free-
doms. The media arena remains open to all kinds of permissible political
views and all kinds of information providers.19
Perhaps one could be tempted to argue that teaching (future) citizens media
competence indirectly manipulates public opinion in a way similar to the
deliberate exploitation of mass communication by political populists, leading
to an indoctrination of mainstream political ideals. However, this is exactly what
media competence education should not be. To the contrary, it is part of an
education that aims at bringing up politically autonomous citizens with at least
basic knowledge to judge the plausibility of media content themselves. Media
competence education contributes to the capacity of citizens to make informed
political choices and have a reasonably clear picture of their larger political
environment.
In doing so, media competence education supports democracy. Aside from
the intrinsic value one might see in the political autonomy of citizens, it
increases the probability of citizens making less biased political decisions.
This increase contributes to more rational outcomes of decision processes that
involve democratic deliberation and voting, thereby improving the overall qual-
ity of democratic decision processes. Particularly because average citizens in
modern democracies get most of their political information via mass media,
more competence in accessing and evaluating media information is an impor-
tant democratic asset.
Nevertheless, one needs to be aware that media competence comes in
degrees and like other kinds of competences, will be distributed unevenly
throughout a population. The degree to which individual citizens will develop
the type of media competence I discuss here will depend on their mental
capacities, on their motivation to employ their knowledge about populist
media effects, and likely on social and economic influences. As with other
forms of competences, there might be no incentive to engage critically with
and of their political autonomy. Such a result would, of course, void any prima facie
justification.
19 Of course, certain content and media providers distributing this content can be censored or
prohibited on other grounds than countering populist media effects. Content that, e. g. aims at
deliberately undermining or overturning democratic institutions would be of that kind.
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media when this is viewed as of no value in one’s social environment, or one’s
mental capacities might be impaired by economic pressures (see Mani et al.
2013). The task of media competence education is to provide children and
adolescents with sufficient knowledge and a range of practical examples to
apply this knowledge, not more.20 It increases the chances of them not falling
for populist media effects later, thus contributing to a stable society. Media
competence education is no panacea against political populism; it constitutes,
however, an important element of a comprehensive programme to secure dem-
ocratic institutions by enabling citizens to make informed choices when voting
and to engage in a more meaningful political deliberation.21
In summary, media competence education appears to be a prima facie robustly
justifiable and autonomy-enhancing measure to counter populist media effects
from the principled view of the political theorist.22 Further, it provides citizens
with necessary knowledge and skills to make valid judgements about deliberate
populist media manipulation, thereby adding to measures liberal democracies can
take to address this problem. At the same time, there are no concerns about media
competence education curtailing rights or liberties of citizens or media providers.
Instead, it appears to be amuchmore practicable and less costly strategy compared
with an extensive and intrusive legal regulation.
20 What exact level of knowledge and of practical exercise is required will be mostly a matter
of empirical context. A democratic society should at least provide minimum knowledge for
citizens to be able to recognise media effects in their daily lives if they are motivated to do so. If
more time and financial resources are available at educational institutions, additional practical
exercises are useful to foster a habituation of media effect recognition in students. On the
question of whether media competence education should in addition aim to inculcate a desire to
apply the relevant knowledge in daily life (perhaps as a sort of democratic virtue) I want to
remain agnostic here. Restrictions on this aim could be (a) normative concerns, depending on
the underlying theoretical liberal and/or democratic framework and (b) the limited availability
of teaching resources that most schools could allocate to media competence and/or civic
education.
21 I use the term ‘political deliberation’ in a wide sense here, which includes deliberation
across various social spheres and groups, from formal public political events to semi-public
exchanges among friends, colleagues, and neighbours.
22 A full justification, all things considered, to integrate media competence education into a
curriculum is more complex and context-dependent. Under real-world conditions, media com-
petence education will have to compete with other valuable educational aims for limited
material resources, aptly trained teachers, and time. In contexts of scarcity, other educational
aims might take priority. It is also possible that the value of various educational aims turns out
to be incommensurable, in which case no definite prioritisation is available.
In addition, for a full justification, it needs to be shown that an effective autonomy-enhanc-
ing education programme is indeed feasible under real-world conditions and not just an
ambitious ideal.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued for using media competence education for children
as a means to increase future citizens’ political autonomy and to improve the
outcome of democratic decision processes. This appears especially relevant in
light of the fact that media effects can support political populism even without
any deliberate attempts of media manipulation. Even if all actors involved only
have the best of intentions, the inherent structure of media systems in combi-
nation with human cognitive biases can lend support to populist propaganda in
a mechanism which I labelled populist media effects.
Populist media effects can impair the political autonomy of citizens by
distorting political information. If citizens make political judgements based on
this distorted information, it reduces their capacity to make reasonable political
decisions that satisfy the democratic standards applied to them in their role as
citizens. If one assumes that it is part of the responsibility of governments to
support the political autonomy of citizens, it seems that governments have an
obligation to counter or minimise populist media effects.
Due to the lack of blameworthy actors that can be held responsible for populist
media effects, it is difficult for political institutions to find strategies to counter
them. I have assessed two ways governments could react to populist media effects:
the first would be to instantiate legal restrictions, the second to provide children
with media competence education. The first option does not seem too promising, as
it is unclear how systemic media effects should be restricted. Even if it were some-
how possible to implement them, it would be difficult to justify any restrictive
measure, particularly considering the costs in terms of interference with the central
liberal democratic principle of freedom of speech.
That being the case, my claim is that education is the preferable option, due to
its robust justifiability in the context of liberal democratic education, its non-
existent interference with citizens’ and media providers’ rights and liberties, and
its potentially autonomy-enhancing effects on future citizens. This provides a
theoretical underpinning for a practice of media competence education that can
already be observed in many existing democracies and which would benefit from
continuous support, especially in the face of contemporary political developments.
It appears that media competence education can be a democratic way of inoculat-
ing future citizens against populism.
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